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old-fashioned) Swinburnian apologetics for the coherence of Christian
beliefs and Plantingian responses to fideism or the more newfangled
developments regularly appearing in issues of this journal. Attending to
the literature might have staved off the many conflations and confusions
in the book about the rational entitlements of Christians in their religious
beliefs that forms the proper background against which to judge whether
some putative theological justification can be judged to be a good or
bad one.
Given these serious defects, I cannot commend McClendon’s book as a
worthwhile philosophical analysis or evaluation of black Christology. For
those SCP readers who wish to become more familiar with that literature
Black Christology and the Quest for Authenticity is an unreliable guide. For
those readers of Faith and Philosophy who wish to constructively engage
with the theological project of black Christology, we must await a more
fruitful treatment to fill the gap identified by this book. That is not to say,
however, that McClendon’s book is wholly without merits. While underdeveloped, the four criticisms I’ve distilled above represent potentially
pressing problems that merit careful reflection from advocates of black
Christology. Teasing out the particular shape that such problems might
take remains important work, but it is work that remains to be done.

The Design Argument, by Elliot Sober. Cambridge University Press, 2018.
Pp. 94. $18.00 (paperback).
JOHN A. KELLER, St. Joseph’s University
Elliott Sober’s The Design Argument is, in many ways, a fine little book.
I certainly enjoyed and benefited from reading it and thinking about the
issues raised within. It’s important to note, however, that the book is an
extremely opinionated introduction to the biological and cosmic design
arguments. The restrictive word limit for the Cambridge Elements series
surely played a role here: when there’s not space to cover everything, one’s
particular judgements about what is most worth covering make a bigger
difference. Still, there are places where I think the perspective represented
in the book is at odds with the state of the literature.
The brief introductory chapter was quite nice. Sober gives a quick but
interesting history of design arguments and lays the terminological and
conceptual groundwork for what follows. Two of Sober’s choices here are
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important later: he defines “God” as the intentional creator of the universe, and claims that design arguments are intended to be
part of natural theology, not revealed theology . . . They do not appeal to the
authority of sacred texts or traditions. Design arguments are intended to
obey the same rules that govern scientific arguments (2).

This way of setting things up rules out design arguments’ appealing to
(purported) facts about God—e.g., that God is good—that follow from
scripture and tradition (or from the idea that God is a perfect being) but
not from the mere claim that God intentionally created the universe.
The primer on probability theory in Chapter 2 was clear, concise, and
engagingly written, but a few more diagrams would have been helpful,
especially for the uninitiated. I had some questions about the intended
audience for the book in general—I had initially assumed that it was undergraduate students—but those questions were particularly acute here. While
the primer is only sixteen pages long, it is quite dense: too dense, I think, to
be used easily and effectively in the classroom. It would take at least three
weeks to teach the material in the primer to undergraduates unfamiliar
with probability theory, and instructors would need to provide supplementary explanations, readings, and practice exercises. By my lights, the chapter
is also too compressed to serve as an effective introduction to probability
theory for anyone. It would be most useful for readers who have some familiarity with probability theory but who could use a refresher. This, to be fair,
describes a fair number of philosophers of religion.
In Chapter 3, Sober considers six ways of formulating design arguments: (i) as significance tests, (ii) as inductive inferences, (iii) as analogical arguments, (iv) in Bayesian terms, (v) in likelihoodist terms, and (vi) as
inferences to the best explanation.
According to Sober, likelihoodism is the best of these frameworks.
I largely agreed with Sober’s criticisms of argument forms (i)-(iii) and (vi),
but I was a bit surprised that Sober chose likelihoodism as the framework
for the book, given that Bayesianism is more familiar to more people.
(Bayesianism is derided for its reliance on ur-priors: a priori probability
assignments not based on experience.) Anyone familiar with Bayesianism
should be able to easily understand likelihoodist arguments, however:
likelihoodism is essentially a restricted form of Bayesianism that eschews
ur-priors and “catchall hypotheses” (disunited negations of real or unified hypotheses). As Sober says, “there are two reasons why likelihoodists
aren’t Bayesians: they often don’t want to talk about the prior and posterior probabilities of theories and they often don’t want to talk about the
likelihoods of catchalls” (22).
Chapter 4 is dedicated to the biological design argument. Sober uses
“Pr(X)” to express the probability that X is true, and “Pr(X|Y)” to express
the probability of X given Y. In those terms, what Sober calls the “Law of
Likelihood” says that evidence E favors hypothesis H1 over hypothesis H2
iff Pr(E|H1) > Pr(E|H2).
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Sober gives the following objection to likelihoodist arguments from
biological design:
Suppose a design argument asserted that
Pr(vertebrates have eyes that have features F1|God gave organisms their
features) > Pr(vertebrates have eyes that have features F1|mindless natural selection caused organisms to have their features)
The problem I have with this claim is that there is no saying whether the
first of these probabilities is big, middling, or small . . . This point about the
God hypothesis, if correct, is fatal to likelihood versions of the biological
design argument, regardless of whether evolutionary theory is able to say
how probable it is that vertebrates have eyes that have features F1 (42).

This problem—the problem of determining God’s goals and the concomitant likelihoods of God doing various things (like ensuring that vertebrates
have eyes with features F1, or fine-tuning the constants)—comes up again
later. I argue below that the problem of God’s goals isn’t as “fatal” as Sober
suggests, and hence that the cogency of the objection here does depend on
the probability of evolution producing features F1. Nonetheless, I agree
with Sober that in fact this probability is high enough to undermine likelihoodist arguments from biological design.
I was, however, taken aback by Sober’s suggestion that deleterious
traits are not evidence against intelligent design. He says,
This Darwinian argument against intelligent design is flawed. If a trait’s
being neutral or deleterious favors evolutionary theory over the God
hypothesis [biological-design hypothesis], then a trait’s being advantageous
must have the opposite evidential significance . . . However, few evolutionists would want to concede that a trait’s being advantageous favors the God
hypothesis over the hypothesis of mindless evolution, and they are right to
resist that conclusion (49).

This can easily be read in a way that is dangerously misleading. Some
people are pleased to say that there’s no evidence for the existence of
God. An important fact about (standard) probabilistic theories of confirmation is that this just isn’t true: there will be all sorts of evidence for
all sorts of claims, including the “God hypothesis.” And advantageous
traits are evidence for the God hypothesis—at least on many standard
definitions of “God”—for precisely the reason Sober discusses. They’re
just not significant evidence, since they don’t significantly favor the God
hypothesis (neither simpliciter nor over evolution). Consider: if I received
a news update saying that Trump had admitted to collusion and resigned,
I’d gain significant evidence for collusion. It follows that when I don’t
receive such a news update, I’ve gained evidence against collusion. That
might seem radically counterintuitive or stupid, but it just falls out of
standard theories of probabilistic confirmation. But while the confirmation provided by receiving such a news update would be significant, the
disconfirmation from not receiving one is insignificant. Indeed, it’s miniscule—miniscule enough that it seems silly to mention it. And it is silly to
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mention it, except in contexts where we’re asking, in the strict and philosophical sense, about what evidence there is. Just so, deleterious traits
are (perhaps significant) evidence against the biological-design hypothesis, and hence advantageous traits are evidence for the God hypothesis.
It doesn’t follow, however, that they’re significant evidence, and indeed
they’re not, since both the God hypothesis and evolution entail that most
traits are advantageous. But even if the discovery of advantageous traits
is merely insignificant evidence for the God hypothesis, it is evidence. Of
course, the relevant question is whether there are any “observations that
favor the God hypothesis over the hypothesis of natural selection” (56).
But the discovery of advantageous traits is evidence favoring the God
hypothesis over natural selection if the probability that a trait will be
advantageous is higher given the God hypothesis than it is given evolution. Since evolution works by trial and error and God is omniscient, that
seems rather plausible.
None of the above entails, or even suggests, that our observations of the
traits of organisms, taken as a whole, favor the God hypothesis over evolution—I agree with Sober that they don’t. But that doesn’t justify saying
that there are no observations favoring the God hypothesis over evolution
at all. That’s just not true, and it gives a misleading impression of how
to think about evidence in probabilistic terms. We shouldn’t spend time
debating whether there’s any evidence that favors one view over another.
That’s silly: pretty much every (non-gerrymandered) view has some evidence that favors it over incompatible (non-gerrymandered) views. What
we should care about, the only thing we should care about, is which view
is best supported by the total evidence.
Sober knows all this, of course: indeed, he has a nice article on issues
in the neighborhood (“Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence:
Evidential Transitivity in Connection with Fossils, Fishing, Fine-Tuning,
and Firing Squads,” Philosophical Studies 143 (2009): 63–90). It’s his
restricted definition of “God” that is doing all the work here. As he says,
I provisionally defined “God” as a being who intentionally created the universe. This definition leaves open whether God is all-PKG [all powerful,
knowing, and good]. In consequence, the existence of imperfect adaptations,
of neutral and deleterious traits, and of evils aplenty all fail to prove that
God does not exist. (51)

While proof is beside the point—what’s at issue is evidence against God’s
existence—deleterious traits etc. plausibly fail to even qualify as evidence
against Sober’s “God,” since that God is defined merely as the (possibly
incompetent or malicious) creator of the universe. One might think that
this suggests that we should use a richer conception of God for assessing
our evidence. Sober, however, says that while taking God to be all-PKG is
an assumption that many atheists and theists embrace . . . why should this
assumption about God’s characteristics be accepted? Does the assumption
have independent justification? (51)
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This strikes me as an odd way of framing things. It’s not that we’re really
only interested in whether a (possibly incompetent or malicious) creator
of the universe exists, and are illicitly assuming the creator is all-PKG
just to bolster certain theological (or atheological) arguments. Christians,
Muslims, and Jews believed in an all-PKG creator before anybody knew
about deleterious traits (or fine-tuning). So it’s natural—indeed commendable—to want to know the evidential significance of deleterious traits (or
fine-tuning) for an all-PKG creator.
Sober’s objection to this is that while the idea of God being all-PKG is
“part of some religion [sic] traditions . . . sacred texts and traditions have
no place in natural theology” (51). But this is just to insist that God’s being
all-PKG is an auxiliary assumption to the hypothesis under evaluation. But
why can’t we evaluate the hypothesis that there’s an all-PKG creator, and
do natural theology with respect to that—especially if that’s what we’re
interested in anyway? Sober suggests at various places that this might be
illicitly “packing” the observations we want to explain into the hypothesis
with which we hope to explain them. While there certainly are illicit forms
of “packing in,” given that God was defined to be all-PKG long before the
discovery of deleterious traits or fine-tuning, it’s hard for me to see how
this could be one.
In the final chapter of the book, Sober discusses the Fine-Tuning
Argument (FTA). He presents it in terms of the following inequality:
Pr(the value of physical constant x is in W|God set the value of x & W is narrow) > Pr(the value of physical constant x is in W|a mindless chance process
set the value of x & W is narrow).

Sober has two main objections to the FTA. As he puts it, “The first focuses
on the FTA’s assumption that God is life-loving. I see no way to provide
that assumption with independent justification. The second . . . is that the
FTA is vitiated by an observation selection effect” (76).
The first objection is the problem of God’s goals again: if we don’t
know that God is life-loving, we don’t know how likely it is that God
would fine-tune the laws, and so (the thought goes) we don’t know
whether that’s more likely than that the laws were fine-tuned by chance.
That might seem plausible, at least if we don’t know the probability of
the laws being fine-tuned by chance. It’s curious that Sober doesn’t actually mention what that probability is. Physicists say that the probability
of the cosmological constant alone being in the life-permitting range is
something like 1/10120. That is astronomically low. In fact, calling it astronomically low is an understatement. There are about 1021 stars in the
known universe. That’s nowhere close to 10120. The number of atoms in
the universe is about 1080. Still nowhere close. A credence that God would
want to fine-tune the universe for rational life that was anywhere in the
neighborhood of 1/10120 would correspond to utter certitude that God
wouldn’t want to do that. I’m utterly certain that I won’t win the next
five Powerball lotteries, but the probability of that is much higher than
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1/10120. So, as long as we’re not utterly certain about what God wouldn’t
want, ordinary uncertainty about what God would want doesn’t undermine the FTA. This response is well represented in the literature, so it’s
odd that Sober doesn’t mention it. If Sober thinks the response is mistaken, it would be nice to be told why. And while we’re at it, it would
be nice to be told what’s wrong with asking about the evidential impact
of fine-tuning on the life-loving god worshipped in the Abrahamic traditions—which would simply bypass the problem of God’s goals—other
than that it wouldn’t count as “natural theology.” Natural theology or
not, it seems like an interesting and important question. (Neil A. Manson
pushes back against the “utter certainty” defense of the FTA in “How Not
to be Generous to Fine-Tuning Sceptics” (Religious Studies, 2018). But my
aim isn’t to be generous to fine-tuning sceptics: I’m not trying to grant
them their premises and argue that the FTA works nonetheless. I’m just
trying to figure out what premises are true.)
Sober’s second objection postulates an observation selection effect that
undermines the FTA. To account for such effects, Sober claims that we
should adopt the “Revised Law of Likelihood”:
Given that P is true, where P is a proposition describing the process by
which the observation was obtained, observation O favors hypothesis H1
over hypothesis H2 if and only if Pr(O|H1&P) > Pr(O|H2&P).

Given this revision, Sober maintains that the FTA hinges on the relationship between:
Pr(the value of physical constant x is in W|God set the value of x & W is
narrow & P) and
Pr(the value of physical constant x is in W|a mindless chance process set the
value of x & W is narrow & P).

Sober claims that these probabilities are the same, since P entails that we
are alive, which entails that the value of x is in W. As he puts it, “Given
that you are alive, the probability of your observing that the constants are
right is the same, regardless of whether the God hypothesis or the chance
hypothesis is true” (70).
This might be true if by “the constants are right” we mean “the constants are life-permitting” (as Sober glosses things (75)). But we’ve always
known that the constants are life-permitting: if W is the life-permitting
range, we’ve known that the constants are in W since we formulated the
idea of a physical constant. The basis for the FTA is that the constants are
in W, and that W is incredibly, unfathomably, narrow. So “W is narrow”
should be on the left side, with the evidence, not the right side, as part of
the hypothesis. This is important because if “W is narrow” belongs on the
left, the FTA hinges on the relationship between:
Pr(the value of physical constant x is in W & W is narrow|God set the value
of x & P)

and

264

Faith and Philosophy

Pr(the value of physical constant x is in W & W is narrow|a mindless chance
process set the value of x & P).

And if that’s right, nothing about P (the process by which we discovered
that x is in W and W is narrow) suggests that the first probability isn’t
larger than the second. We might have discovered—we expected to discover—laws that didn’t need fine-tuning. (Sober himself asks why God
didn’t create such laws if God likes life so much.) But, in fact, we discovered laws that don’t permit life to exist across a wide range of values for
their constants. That fact is crucial to the FTA. And so there isn’t an observation selection effect generated by the fact that we’re alive. Sober seems
to acknowledge this (n. 74), and notes in response that this alternative
formulation of the FTA still faces the problem of God’s goals. Maybe so (or
maybe not), but wouldn’t it make sense to focus on the strongest version
of the FTA in the main text?
The last two pages of the book discuss the “multiverse objection,”
widely taken to be the most powerful objection to the FTA. Given the significance of the objection in the literature, it’s striking that Sober’s discussion is so brief, and that some of the most important responses to the
objection are not considered. I found this odd, and odd in a way emblematic of the book as a whole.
I really did enjoy reading The Design Argument. There are lucid and
enlightening discussions of many aspects of the biological and cosmic
design arguments. But there are also peculiar decisions about what gets
covered, and how things get covered, and how much things get covered,
and what objections to what get covered. Such decisions are unavoidable: the book is short and wide-ranging. But the particular decisions
Sober makes paint an idiosyncratic picture of the state of the literature.
Of course, it would be unreasonable to expect Sober to agree with me
about the exact state of the debate. But it doesn’t seem unreasonable to
expect that, having read a book on design arguments, one would (for
example) be familiar with the suggestion that uncertainty about God’s
goals is compatible with the FTA, and have a sense of the centrality of,
and complexities surrounding, the multiverse objection. Neither topic
needs to be extensively discussed, especially if Sober thinks them peripheral. But some footnotes acknowledging the controversy in the literature
would have been appropriate. So while I think The Design Argument is
an excellent introduction to Sober’s work on design arguments—and
his work on design arguments is important indeed—it’s worth keeping
in mind that it’s a partisan and non-comprehensive introduction to the
overall state of the literature on design arguments themselves. (Thanks to
Nevin Climenhaga, Joseph Corabi, Lorraine Juliano Keller, Neil Manson,
Andrew Payne, Steve Petersen, Daniel Rubio, and especially Elliott Sober
for helpful feedback.)

